Abstract-Modern operating systems use a number of different techniques and mechanisms to improve system throughput and performance. But some of these optimizations can passively leak crucial side-channel information regarding sensitive data that is being processed and stored in the system. In this paper, we talk about one such optimization mechanism prevalent in modern Linux based operating system, called page frame cache, which is an integral part of physical memory allocation subsystem. It is a purely software cache storing the page frames that are recently being released by the process or processes running on the corresponding CPU. We show that an adversary can force the kernel to allocate specific page frames to a victim process, running on the same CPU. We also discuss about the possibility of a practical scenario where the adversary can conduct Rowhammer attack to induce bit flips in the victim's page using only user level privilege.
I. INTRODUCTION
Operating Systems are low-level system software that act as an intermediary between the user applications and the underlying computer hardware. Modern operating systems are highly optimized for better performance, efficiency and security. To increase the efficiency of the system and also to make it programmer-friendly, modern operating systems employ virtual memory management technique. Since its inception, virtual memory has been an integral part of most operating systems. In virtual memory based operating systems, the address space is broken into fixed-sized intervals called pages and essentially mapped into physical page frames. Physical memory allocation is another important constituent of the virtual memory subsystem. When a program is executed, the operating system creates a special environment for the program to run. This environment contains all the necessary things for the system to run and gives an illusion to the program such that it is the only process running in the system. The OS kernel then allocates some memory for the program. The process of memory allocation is handled by different memory allocators of the kernel. The performance of a computer system largely depends on how efficiently the dynamic memory allocation is handled. In other words, how efficiently the process of virtual to physical address translation mechanism and the memory allocation is managed by the kernel plays an important role in determining the performance of the system.
As operating systems have evolved over the years to provide enhanced performance and security, the hardware components of computer systems have equally ushered through a series of technological advancement. The Dynamic Random Access Memory, one of the most essential component of a computer, have been constantly scaled down to accommodate larger number of memory cells into smaller physical space, thereby reducing the cost-per-bit of memory. However, cramming a large number of DRAM cells in small space leads to electromagnetic coupling effects among themselves, resulting in bit flips [1] . This phenomenon is termed as Rowhammer where repeated access to a particular row in DDR3 DRAM chips can induce bit faults in adjacent rows. The authors [1] accessed a sequence of memory locations and after every access, flushed the contents from cache so that all the accessed are served from the DRAM only. They observed that due to their closely packed architecture, a bit flip can occur in adjacent rows, even if those locations might not be accessible to the attacker. This discovery brought in light some serious security vulnerabilities on most of the commercial DRAM chips which have been in use for so many years and paved the way for further investigations and research. Soon researchers came up with practical implementations of Rowhammer where they induced bit flips to gain kernel privileges [2] , escape from sandbox environment [2] , gain access to remote system via Javascript enabled websites [3] , obtain hypervisor privilege in cross-VM setting [4] , etc. In recent years, a number of work has been proposed which discusses about different methods to conduct Rowhammer in various environments [5] - [7] . In [8] , the authors combined Rowhammer with a well known Prime + Probe attack to induce bit flips in the secret exponent of public key crytposystem.
In this paper, we present a new method of conducting Rowhammer on a specific page using the property of page frame cache. We provide a brief background on virtual mem-ory and physical memory in section II and III respectively. In section IV, we present a detailed analysis on the current allocation schemes that are used in Linux operating system. We exploit the page frame cache in section V, used in modern Linux based operating systems, to strategically force the operating system to place sensitive data into predefined pages in memory which are known to be vulnerable to Rowhammer attack to the adversary. These pages, when subjected to Rowhammer attack (discussed in section VI), can induce bit faults in the secret data which can be further exploited using sophisticated fault analysis techniques.
II. BACKGROUND
The virtual memory subsystem is one of the most important components of memory management in Linux based operating systems. It allows the separation of logical memory as perceived by the user from the actual physical memory. Virtual memory creates an abstraction between the user and system where the programs are no longer limited by the amount of physical memory in the system. It is achieved through a combination of group of fixed-length linear addresses, called pages and address translation hardware which converts logical addresses generated by the processor to physical address in the underlying computer system. The operating system logically partitions the entire physical main memory into fixed-length page frames such that each page fits into a page frame. The mapping from virtual memory to physical memory is stored in special data structures called page tables. These are multilevel tables are stored in physical memory and readable by the translation hardware.
Modern CPUs operate much faster than the main memory unit (typically DRAM) associated with it. Thus processor speed is somewhat limited by the memory access speeda paradigm known as memory wall. This limitation was mitigated to a large extent by bringing a small and very high speed cache memory, in between the processor and the main memory and using sophisticated algorithms to avoid cache misses. However, with the ever increasing size of the operating system and the number of applications running on them simultaneously, these highly efficient cache processing technologies soon became insufficient to provide high performance. With the advent of multi-processor systems, this problem became more prominent because now only one processor can access the memory at any point of time, making a lot of processes to starve.
Non Uniform Memory Access (NUMA) attempts to address this problem in multi-processor system by providing separate memory for each processor, thus avoiding the degradation in performance when multiple processors are trying to access memory simultaneously. In modern machines, memory is organised into banks that incur different access time depending on its relative distance from the processor.
III. PHYSICAL MEMORY
DRAM typically constitutes the main memory of a modern computer. The memory controller is connected with the motherboard via slots called channels. Each DRAM card is a circuit board consisting of physical memory modules called Dual Inline Memory Module which further consists of one or more rank. Each rank is comprises of multiple banks, generally 8 in number. Each bank is a group of DRAM cells arranged in a two-dimensional structure in rows and columns.
In NUMA based systems, each bank is called a node and each node is divided into a number of blocks called zone. Linux uses a node-local allocation policy when allocating page to processes such that the memory is allocated from the node closest to the CPU running the program [9] . Inside a node, page frame is the primary unit for all types of memory allocations -storing kernel data, user information, buffering disk data and so on. In order to enforce constraints on storing page frames for different purposes, the physical memory in each node is divided into three zones -ZONE_DMA, ZONE_NORMAL, ZONE_HIGHMEM in case of 32 bit architectures and ZONE_DMA, ZONE_DMA32, ZONE_NORMAL in case of 64 bit architectures. Each zone type is suitable for specific purpose; however, they can be used for other purposes as well depending on the situation.
• ZONE DMA. First 16MB of physical memory. Mainly used to allocate pages for DMA capable devices in both 32 bit and 64 bit architectures.
• ZONE DMA32. This zone exists only in 64 bit systems.
The memory ranges from 16MB to 4GB. This zone can be used for both DMA operations and normal operations.
• ZONE NORMAL. On 64 bit systems, this zone comprises everything beyond 4GB, while on 32 bit system, it is from 16MB to 896 MB containing normal, regularly mapped pages.
• ZONE HIGHMEM. This zone is only present in 32 bit systems ranging from 896MB to the end. It usually contains highmemory, which are temporarily mapped pages in kernel address space.
IV. MEMORY ALLOCATION SCHEMES
When kernel invokes an allocation mechanism to request pages, it must specify the zone from where it expects the page frame to come from. Of course, if the request cannot be satisfied by the preferred zone, the allocation function will try to get the page frames from other zones in order as maintained in zonelist. However, all the requested page frames must come from a single zone. If none of the memory zones have sufficient pages, the kernel awakens the kswapd to free up pages from zones. The allocation requests for a group of contiguous page frames is handled by the zoned page frame allocator. The zone allocator selects the zone which can satisfy the request for contiguous page frames. Inside each zone, the allocation is handled by the core allocator for Linux, called Buddy allocator. In this allocation scheme, the pages are clustered into large blocks of size in power of two. When a request for certain amount of memory comes from the processor, the algorithm first searches the blocks of pages to check if the request can be met. If no blocks of pages are Free Page Block Management Allocating Physical pages Fig. 1 : Buddy Allocation Scheme [9] found to meet the demand, block of the next size is split into half and one half is allocated to the requesting process. The two smaller blocks thus produced are called buddies to each other. The process of splitting a block into half continues until a block of desired size is obtained. Figure 1 shows the working principle of buddy allocation scheme. When the allocated block becomes free, the buddy block is also examined. If both are free, they are merged together and returned back to their original block size. The coalescing of blocks on deallocation gives rise to the name of the allocation scheme. The kernel will try to merge pairs of free buddy blocks of size if both are of same size and located in contiguous memory. The main advantage of buddy system is that the address of the buddy of a free block can be easily calculated from the address for the free block, making it easier and efficient to implement.
Frequent allocation and deallocation of blocks of contiguous memory can leave "holes" in the memory -a phenomenon known as external fragmentation. Buddy Allocation system helps in avoiding this situation. Suppose, a program requests a group of page frames for 1 MB memory. The buddy allocation algorithm first checks the list for 2 8 page block. If no such free block is found, it checks the block for 2 9 and so on. If such a block exists, it splits the block in half; one half is allocated to the process requesting the memory and the other half is added to the list of 2 8 page block. Similarly, when the process deallocates the memory, the algorithm searches for its buddy and if free, coalesces and adds the block into 2 9 page block list.
The kernel maintains a per-CPU page frame cache for each memory zone. This small software cache of recently deallocated (released) page frames are used by the Buddy allocator if the local CPU requests a small amount of memory, typically a few pages. The page frame cache is maintained for each CPU inside each zone. The presence of page frame cache can significantly boost up the system performance. Figure 2 shows the components of Linux page frame allocator for x86-64 machine.
V. EXPLOITING PAGE FRAME CACHE
When an application requests memory, the kernel first invokes the zone allocator which in turn invokes the buddy allocator to satisfy the request. During the course of running of the application, it might request and/or release memory dynamically which must be serviced by the buddy allocator. Based on the principle of locality of reference, Linux uses per-CPU based page frame cache to hold some of the recently deallocated page frames. The cache is specific to the node and thereby the CPU on which the application is running. If the same program requests some page, it can be serviced from the page frame cache, thereby boosting the performance of the system. However, the page frame cache can be used by an adversary, operating in a multi-user environment, to force the kernel to allocate sensitive data of other user or processes, in some specific physical page frame.
Suppose, a program is running on a 64-bit x86 machine. It first requests a large amount of memory using mmap. The request is passed on to the zone allocator by the kernel which selects the zone from the zonelist. The buddy allocator scans the list of page frame blocks and finds out a block that can satisfy the request. It must be noted that the program must store some data into the allocated pages, otherwise the physical page frames will not be allocated. Now, the program deallocates a page by using the function unmmap. The unmapped page will reside in the page frame cache of the zone and corresponding to the CPU on which the program is currently running. If the same program requests for additional memory during the course of its execution, the kernel will try to serve the page frames from the cache, if the request is small and can be satisfied by the cache; else, it will invoke the buddy allocator once more. So, with a probability of almost 1, if the process requests for a few pages, the recently deallocated page frames will be reallocated, along with other page frames. The situation becomes interesting when there is another process running simultaneously on the system and sharing the same CPU. Once again we have a process running on the system which allocates a large memory, unmaps one or two pages and waits. It must be mentioned here that the [10] adversarial process must remain active rather than going into inactive state (sleeping), since in that case the entire process state information including page frame cache will be swapped out of memory. Now, if a process, more generally a victim process, running on the same CPU requests some memory, the kernel will first try to service the request from the page frame cache itself. Thus, the page frame that was unmapped by the adversarial process gets allocated to the victim process.
VI. THE THREAT: ROWHAMMER
Rowhammer has been used as a tool to break different security primitives imposed by the operating system. Some of the attacks have already been discussed in section I. It is a phenomenon observed in DRAM chips due to electrical interaction between adjacent cells. An attacker cannot control the location or frequency of getting bit flips using Rowhammer unless she is CAP SYS ADMIN capable. If an adversary have access to pagemap, she can get the page frame number (PFN) of the target page. However, "since Linux 4.0, only users with the CAP SYS ADMIN capability can get PFNs" [11] . In practical scenario, an attacker might not have CAP SYS ADMIN privilege to precisely identify the location of sensitive user data and perform double sided Rowhammer to induce faults. However, using the page frame cache as a side channel, the attacker can substantially increase his chances of successfully conducting a Rowhammer attack. An adversary having only user level privilege can conduct Rowhammer without any additional pagemap information. Ofcourse, the bit flips, if any, will be uncontrolled and does not guarantee any meaningful exploitation. The attacker first allocates a large memory space (typically 1 GB) and starts the Rowhammer process. After getting a bit-flip, she unmaps the corresponding page frame using unmmap. This is possible since the unmmap function takes the virtual address of the starting of a page as an argument. After unmapping, the process waits (in active mode) for the victim. The unmapped page frame can be considered as "vulnerable" to Rowhammer as it contains a memory cell susceptible to bit-flips. This page will be stored in the page frame cache until it is assigned again to some process. The victim, operating on the same CPU, requests for memory in order to store some data. If the request for memory is small (a few pages), the kernel will try to allocate page frames from the cache itself. After some time, the adversary starts hammering once again in her virtual address space. We have observed that there is a high probability of getting bit flips in the same location when conducting Rowhammer on the same virtual address space. Based on this observation, we can say that the adversary might be able to induce bit flips once more in the same page that now holds the victim data.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Linux kernel uses a number of optimization techniques to enhance the performance and efficiency of the underlying hardware. Dynamic memory allocation is one of the most important feature, which can seriously affect the performance if not handled properly. The Linux kernel uses Zone Allocator and Buddy Allocator together to allocate the physical memory to all the user and kernel processes. For better performance and efficiency, every memory zone is associated with a per-CPU page frame cache that can hold a small number of page frames that are recently been released by a running process. In this paper, we observe that every CPU in the system has a page frame cache and it can be exploited to force the kernel to assign pages which are susceptible to Rowhammer to an unaware victim process. All the reported attacks on Rowhammer either targets a large address space, or uses pagemap information to attack specific memory location. Using the page frame cache, we argue that it is possible to perform targetted Rowhammer on very small amount of data (as small as a single page) without having any special privilege. The same attack methodology can be used to target cryptographic implementations and induce persistent faults [12] which can be exploited offline to eventually extract key information.
